The Last Supertition

I've finally obtained a copy of Ed Feser's The Last Superstition, his long-winded defense of superstition and bigotry.  I had really hoped it wouldn't be quite this horrible.  In particular, I hoped to get some insight into how Feser sees Thomism as relevant to modern science and thought.  However, he has so little helpful to say on the subject I almost wonder if he's ever thought about it, and while he does have a lot to say about the naturalistic or scientific worldview, he makes it very clear that he doesn't understand it.

I still have some plans to post more detailed criticisms of such arguments as he does provide, but I will start by giving a brief description of the big picture which is very different from Feser's.  It seems to be one with which he is in fact entirely unfamiliar in any form, as he does not bother to mention this account or anything like it, much less explain why he doesn't see things in this way.

The extraordinary success of science in the modern era is largely a result of the widespread recognition, to varying degrees and to be sure usually not consciously, of the fact that unsatisfying explanations are usually better than satisfying ones.  They have two primary advantages.  First, satisfying explanations tend to be accepted even if they are useless, or outright misleading and harmful.  Unsatisfying explanations, on the other hand, are never taken seriously unless they are demonstrably useful.  Second, unsatisfying explanations stimulate the further search for knowledge, as due to their unsatisfying nature they leave us always feeling that there is more work to be done.*

Feser argues against the scientific worldview that it is unsatisfying, and defends satisfying explanation.  He seems to find Thomistic explanations especially satisfying; of course an additional disadvantage of satisfying explanation is that different people are satisfied by quite different explanations, and there is no apparent way to judge who's right.  Feser is mistaken in thinking that the unsatisfying features of the scientific worldview can be separated from its success, as well as in thinking that the scientific worldview has any need of satisfying explanations.  Of course he uses other terminology; he generally uses "incoherent" to mean "unsatisfying" and "rational" to mean "satisfying," but this attempt at persuasive definition is consistently unpersuasive.

 * It is this second feature of the scientific enthusiasm for unsatisfying explanations that leads Heidegger to identify the scientific worldview with the eternal striving of the Nietzschean will to power.  Like Feser, Heidegger was a critic of the scientific worldview and a right wing nut, but unlike Feser, Heidegger seems to have understood what the debate was actually about.

Comments

[Funnyatheists.wordpress.com]

Wow, nice review! I am am definitely looking forward to your more detailed criticisms.

[D]

This is a comment I was going to leave on your Amazon review of 'The Last Superstition,' but apparently you have to have purchased something from Amazon before they let you comment. Oh well, I'll post it here:

I was going to comment on this review, but unfortunately there's literally *nothing* of substance to comment upon. I wonder if the reviewer has actually read the book.

For example, we get: "as best I can extract it from the incredibly thick polemic in which it is buried, he argues that without final causation, there's no non-Humean causation, and all final causation must terminate in God. But neither of these steps could be convincing without considerably further explanation and support than he offers."

But notice that Boyden fails to recapitulate Feser's argument, even in a bare bones form, and fails to show precisely where he thinks "further explanation and support" is needed.

Or, take this: "I expected him to misunderstand and misrepresent the naturalist position"

But notice that Boyden fails to provide a single example of Feser's "misunderstandings" and "misrepresentations." (One wonders how Boyden distinguishes what he takes to be Feser's 'misunderstandings,' which are not intentional, from his 'misrepresentations,' which must be intentional. One wonders if Boyden cares about the difference between the two.)

Another example: "Sadly, his presentation of his Thomistic view was far too sketchy to give one the slightest inkling of how he might respond to countless obvious (and frequently raised) difficulties."

Well, exactly where was it sketchy? What did it lack? Care to offer an example -- at least one? What difficulties did Feser fail to respond to? If they're so obvious, what prevented you from providing at least one example? (Could it be the fear that someone who has actually read the book might read your "review"?)

Let's go on:

"Further, of course, he did misunderstand and misrepresent the naturalist position very badly."

How? Where? If it was so bad, wouldn't it be easy to provide an example?

I could go on with this sort of thing, but what's the point? But let me address one final comment:

"I would be remiss if I didn't point out that all this mass of stilted rhetoric and terrible argument is advanced in the cause of bigotry; the first paragraph of his preface establishes the importance he attaches to his anti-gay agenda."

This takes the cake. Feser defends a version of natural law morality, provides metaphysical arguments (whether you think they're good arguments is another issue altogether) to support his position, only mentions homosexuality in a handful of paragraphs throughout the entire three hundred plus page book, and you see this as "a mass of rhetoric" in support of an "anti-gay agenda"? (Does merely defending Feser from this idiotic charge, in Boyden's mind, make me anti-gay too? I suspect it does.)

I have to wonder again if Boyden actually read the book. Or maybe he understands "reading a book" to mean reading the introduction, the book jacket, and some negative reviews of the book. Unfortunately, the utter lack of substance in this "review" supports this notion.

[Aaron Boyden]

Yes, I read Feser's book. I wonder if you did. Given how blatant the falsehood of some of your statements about my review are, I'd find it hard to believe you even read the review if you hadn't quoted it so extensively (and helpfully provided clear evidence that you didn't understand it). Still, while most of your points are already refuted by what you quote from me, there is a bit that you didn't quote which would be necessary to refute one of your points. You're right that it would be easy to provide an example of Feser getting the naturalist position wrong. That's why I did so, in some of the tiny bit of material in the review you didn't quote.

[www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnxJ4f7MH5TOcsHH4TXJwXvI_WUBM4iNr8]

Many so-called conservatives want to 'turn back the clock' to the Age of Reagan, or to the conformist 1950's, or even the Robber Baron era, but Feser seems to want to throw out the clock altogether and replace it with a sun dial!

It's difficult how he's going to garner much sympathy for his views when he characterizes the philosophy of America's Founders as deluded and the basis of the liberties and toleration we currently enjoy unfounded.

Whether a 'justification' for post-Enlightenment values can be wrenched from 'natural law' cannot be doubted - such systems are ultimately capable of supporting any conclusion as they are built on word games and nothing more. But the fact remains it was only after the rejection of the intellectual straight jacket of Scholastic philosophy that science flourished and popular democracy became possible.